Past research has identified several variables that influence members' of Congress roll-call behavior.
The BFW model focuses on party control, presidential honeymoons, presidential approval, and party polarization.
Party Control and Presidential Success
According to George Edwards and Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher, the foremost factor affecting presidential success with Congress is party control. 10 Presidential support is higher among members of the president's party than among the opposition. As a result, the president's position is more likely to win more votes when his party controls Congress than when the opposition party is in power.
Past research has identified multiple reasons for the strong influence of party on congressional behavior. First, because members of the same political party must satisfy similar electoral coalitions, they share a wide range of policy preferences. Co-partisans and their constituents are therefore more likely to agree with the president's policy preferences than are opposition party members. Second, members of the president's party must run on his record as well as their own, which provides them with an incentive to help him succeed. In addition, the majority party controls important levers of power in Congress, including committees, access to the floor, and rules governing debate and roll call voting. So, the issues on the congressional agenda and presentation of choices to members are more likely to reflect the president's preferences when his party controls the chamber.
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The Presidential Honeymoon
New presidents also tend to enjoy higher success early in their first terms. During the so-called honeymoon, the public, the Washington press corps, and members of Congress are predisposed to give a newcomer the benefit of the doubt. As a result, this period is widely viewed as the most propitious time for presidential initiatives. 12 Paradoxically, the first year is also a period of learning and adjustment for the president, so there is no guarantee that he will be able to exploit the potential benefits of the honeymoon. 13 
Popular Support
Public approval provides a third source of presidential success in Congress. According to Neustadt, the president's popularity affects calculations of electoral self-interest among members of Congress because they fear electoral retribution if they either oppose a popular president or support an unpopular one. In Neustadt's words: members of Congress "must take account of popular reactions to their actions. What their publics think of them becomes a factor, therefore, in deciding how to deal with the desires of a President. His prestige enters into that decision; their publics are part of his." 14 Public approval, however, should have only a marginal effect on presidential success because of other, often more powerful, forces influencing members' roll-call votes, such as constituency and party. 15 For instance, members of Congress may vote against a popular president who takes a position on an issue that their constituents oppose. 16 
Party Polarization
Party polarization in Congress is the final major political context factor that affects presidential success. Polarization, however, has an indirect effect on success. According to Bond, Fleisher and Wood, during periods of low party polarization an increasing number of members of Congress experience conflicts among their cues, such as party and ideology, when they decide how to cast their votes. When many members experience such conflict, the level of public approval for the president becomes more influential in their decisions. During periods of high partisanship, there are fewer cross-pressured members, and the effect of public approval declines. 17 Party polarization also conditions the relationship between party control and presidential success. Presidents typically champion the preferences of their party's mainstream. 18 When parties are polarized, presidential cues reinforce the primary cues of members from his party, which results in fewer defections and which leads to higher success if his party controls the chamber.
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The effects, however, are likely to differ in the House and Senate. Two features of the Senate tend to insulate Senators from popular influences and to mute the effects of both public opinion and party. First, Senators serve six-year terms, and only one-third face the voters in any given election. The president's popularity is not likely to affect the reelection chances of the two-thirds of Senators whose next election is more than two years away. Second, Senate rules, such as the filibuster, allow individuals and the minority party to block legislation they oppose, whereas House rules allow even a slim partisan majority to win if it is cohesive. If parties are cohesive, the president will get greater support from his co-partisans, but less support from the opposition. Polarized parties in the House, therefore, should increase the success of majority presidents and decrease the success of minority presidents. Majority control is less of an advantage in the Senate governed by supermajoritarian decision rules, and polarized parties may reduce the advantage of majority control even more because a cohesive minority party is better able to block cloture.
Variables
We will measure the dependent variable, presidential success on the floor of the House and Senate, in terms of the annual percentage of conflictual roll calls from 1953 through 2010, the last year for which we have complete data . 19 We will define a conflictual presidential roll call as one on which 20 percent or more of members vote against the president.
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We will exclude consensual presidential victoriesby which we mean-to limit the analysis to relatively important issues. A casual check of issues passed by near unanimous margins with the president's support reveals that, with rare exceptions, these are minor and routine issues. Votes that the president lost with more than 80 percent voting against him will remain in the analysis. These unusual cases reflect acute inter-institutional conflict. Such cases neither trivial nor routine, and belong in the analysis.
The most important independent variable is party control of the House and Senate, which will be measured by a dummy variable 21 , coded 1 when the president's party controls the chamber and 0 6 otherwise. 22 We expect that other independent variables will have marginal effects on success. We will measure the honeymoon with a dummy variable, coded 1 for the first year after the president's first election and 0 otherwise. We will code Lyndon Johnson with an early honeymoon in 1964, but Gerald Ford without a honeymoon. Second term presidents will not receive a second honeymoon. 23 We will use the average annual percentage approving of the president's job performance according to the Gallup job approval question-"Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the incumbent] is doing his job as president?"
The percentage of party votes in each chamber per year will indicate party polarization in Congress.
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The annual percentage of all recorded votes in which a majority of Democrats opposed a majority of Republicans will define party vote. We modify the usual practice and exclude consensual roll calls (that is, roll calls with 10 percent or fewer members voting in the minority). This revised measure will indicate the percentage of all conflict on roll call votes that is party conflict. 25 According to the BFW model, party polarization should not affect presidential success directly, but will condition the effects of public approval and party control on success. To measure this conditional effect, we will create interaction terms by multiplying approval or party control by the percentage of party votes in each chamber. 26 We will analyze the House and Senate separately, and will expect the effects of approval, party control, and the interactions to be weaker in the Senate than in the House.
Results of the Updated Models
Our analysis brings the BFW model up to date in two stages. We first extend the model from 1953 through 2008, prior to Obama's taking office. We then extend it through 2010, the last year for which we have complete data. Turning to the Senate, we see honeymoon effects but no significant effect for approval.
Party control has significant effect for 1953-2008, but not in the model based on the full time series.
Contrary to the BFW analysis of data through 2001, none of the interactions approaches conventional significance levels. The inclusion of so many correlated variables raises the specter of multicollinearity, which perhaps obscures the influence of party control and other variables. Table 2 presents reduced-form equations, which include only statistically significant independent variables. 29 The political-context model continues to predict presidential success quite well for the House with R 2 s above .80. Public approval no longer seems to play a significant role, perhaps because party control has become more important as party polarization in the House has widened. At the average level of party votes (67.7 percent), majority presidents win almost 34 percent more votes than minority presidents. The coefficient for party polarization is about -1.00, indicating that minority presidents win about one percent fewer House votes for every one percent increase in party votes. The coefficient for the interaction term is positive 1.63 and 1.71, indicating that majority presidents win about one-and-two-thirds percent more votes for every one percent increase in party votes.
[ Table 2 about here] The reduced Senate model indicates that presidents tend to win more often during their honeymoon year and if public approval increases. The model suggests that presidents win about eight to ten percent more often during their first year in office. The effect of public approval is more marginal-a relatively large 10-percent increase in approval 30 is associated with about 2.5 percent more wins. Party control has a strong positive effect, with majority presidents winning about 20 percent more votes. As expected, the benefits of majority control are less in the Senate than in the House (≈ 34 percent). The coefficient for party polarization is -.22 and significant, but the interaction is not significant. This result indicates that both majority and minority presidents win about 2.2 percent fewer votes with a 10 percent increase in party votes. 03; slopes close to zero and not significant), the effect of party voting on success differs markedly for majority and minority presidents. In the House, the relationship is positive for majority presidents and negative for minority presidents-if the percentage of party votes increases 10 percent, majority party presidents win about 6.5 percent more votes while minority presidents win about 10 percent less (p < .001, R 2 s ≈ .50). But notice that the success rates of majority and minority presidents differ only slightly when party voting falls below about 60 percent. In other words, if parties are not cohesive, majority presidents tend to get less support from their party and minority presidents are better able to attract support from the opposition.
[ Figures 1 and 2 about here]
The relationships in the Senate are much weaker: R 2 = .04 for majority presidents and .07 for minority presidents (see Figure 2) . The slopes are negative and of similar magnitude for both majority and minority presidents. Although the coefficients are not significant at conventional levels (p > .11 and .15 for majority and minority presidents respectively), they suggest that a 10-percent increase in party votes decreases the success rate about 1.9 percent for majority presidents and about 2.9 percent for minority presidents. 31 During periods of high polarization, party becomes a stronger voting cue for members of Congress. However, greater partisanship has different effects in the House and Senate. In the House, as the parties become more cohesive and polarized, party control balloons in importancemajority party presidents win more often and minority presidents lose more often. The Senate is a more complex story. Although party remains a significant influence on roll call voting in that chamber, Senate rules allow a minority to stall and even block issues from coming to the floor. This reduces the effect of party control on presidential success. Compared to their experiences in the House, majority-party presidents in the Senate receive a smaller boost of support, and minority party presidents lose less often. The right of unlimited debate (filibuster) and Senate rule XXII, requiring a supermajority to invoke cloture, are keys to minority power. Individual senators on both the right and the left have long used the filibuster to block passage of legislation they strongly opposed. Historically, filibustering was not related to party control of the chamber. 32 Indeed, the majority party undertook many of the best-known filibusters. Increasing party polarization in Congress transformed the filibuster into a partisan tool. The minority party now routinely uses it to influence policymaking and to block the confirmation of presidential nominees. 33 Consequently, unlike the House, high levels of party polarization in the Senate tend to lower the success rate of both majority and minority presidents. For most years, the plots for both the House and the Senate are quite similar with only small gaps between the actual and predicted scores. Nevertheless, for several years substantial gaps appear between actual and predicted success. Moreover, they appear at different times for each chamber. In the House (Figure 3) , the large gaps appear mainly during the 1960s and 1970s, with only two in recent years (2004 and 2008) . In the Senate (Figure 4) , the gaps occur primarily in recent years.
[ Figures 3 and 4 Obama's actual success, the greater our confidence that political conditions account for his success, rather than his political skills.
As Table 3 shows, the political-context model, using the full data series, predicts Obama's success with nearly pinpoint accuracy in the House. It misses his rate of success by only 1.2 and - [ Table 3 about here] If Greenstein's assessment is correct, we should find that Obama's success rates were significantly higher than would be expected by random chance. We will test statistical significance with a type of standardized residuals used in earlier analysis. 35 Using a 95 percent confidence interval, absolute values greater than about 2.02 are considered unusual. We would expect one in twenty to appear unusual by random chance-about 2.9 unusual observations in each chamber for a sample of size 58. We could not find any systematic pattern in these residuals consistent with expectations about which presidents were especially skilled or unskilled. We do not observe significant residuals in both chambers in the same year, nor do they cluster for any particular president. Although we do find two significant residuals for George W. Bush in the Senate, these unusual residuals point in opposite directions, with Bush winning significantly more than predicted in 2002 and significantly less in 2004.
For presidents included in the Fleisher, Bond, and Wood study, we find a similar pattern. Looking at Obama's success, we do not observe support for the claim that he was unusually successful. His success in the House was very close to what should be expected given the context. He did win more than expected in the Senate in both years, and the residual in 2009 is near the cutoff to consider a residual unusual. In our view, this pattern does not imply that Obama was unusually successful with the Senate. First, why would Obama be more successful than expected in the Senate than in the House? We know of no theory suggesting that presidential skills would be more effective for one chamber than the other. Second, from Paul Light's "cycle of increasing effectiveness" perspective, the pattern of under-prediction in the Senate from 2009 to 2010 is puzzling. 39 Light suggests that presidents become more effective over time because they learn while on the job. Hence, if presidential skills influence relations with Congress, the impact should be more obvious the longer the president is in office. Here we see just the opposite: the gap between Obama's actual and predicted success was much larger in 2009 than 2010.
Another approach to assessing whether Obama is uncommonly successful is to look at the performance of other presidents who dealt with polarized parties in Congress, such as Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Party voting during the Clinton and Bush years averaged 76 and 78 percent in the House and Senate respectively. This is somewhat lower than the 88 and 90 percent during Obama's first two years in office. Still, party voting for Clinton and Bush was higher than the averages of 63 and 56 percent for previous presidents. When we focus on Clinton and Bush's first two years, (See Figure 5) , we find that in both cases, the House model predicts nearly as well as it did for Obama, with success slightly less than expected in one year and slightly more in the other.
The predictions for the Senate also resemble those for Obama. Clinton and Bush did better than expected in both years, but with the second year higher (significantly better for Bush), which is consistent with "cycle of increasing effectiveness" concept. Based on this evidence, it is hard to argue persuasively that Obama's political skills-extraordinary as they may be-generated a greater amount of success given the political context. Turning to the Senate, we find that the model's predictive power is less strong but good in general. The decline in predictive power, however, does not lead us to conclude that presidential skills account for the weaker results. Although the model predicts success in the Senate less accurately than in the House, we do not find more large errors than would be expected by random chance. Moreover, the pattern of errors is not consistent with the skills hypothesis. Rather, we present evidence suggesting that party polarization is at least partially responsible. Whereas greater partisanship amplifies the effect of party control in the majoritarian House, it diminishes the effect of party control in the supermajoritarian Senate. In the Senate, as party polarization increases, success rates decline for both majority and minority presidents. Although the filibuster once was a tool that small minorities of individual Senators used to protect their interests, party polarization has transformed it into a partisan tool that the minority party uses to block policies and nominees contrary to party interest. As these supermajoritarian procedures became partisan tools, the frequency of their use has increased dramatically. As a result, the president's allies in the Senate increasingly need to muster 60 votes to pass major policies and get nominees confirmed.
Looking ahead to the 112 th Congress, our results suggest that Obama's success in the House will fall precipitously under Republican control. Since party polarization is higher under Obama than Bush and Clinton, the model predicts that his success rate will drop even more than was the case for earlier minority presidents. In the Senate with Democrats nominally controlling the chamber, Obama should be more successful than in the House. Nevertheless, with the increase in party polarization, we suspect that Obama may have lower levels of success than would be expected for a majority-party president dealing with less polarized parties.
With respect to the debate between skills and context as foundations for presidential success in Congress, our analysis detected no evidence that skills matter systematically, and our findings lend additional support for the context explanation. In our opinion, political context-party control in Congress, the degree of party polarization, and to a lesser extent honeymoon and public approval-determines the broad parameters of presidential success on floor votes in Congress.
Yet, the political-context model leaves much variance unexplained, and we should not necessarily dismiss political skills as irrelevant. "Skill" is an elusive concept, and no statement in the literature provides a sufficiently precise definition that would allow us to measure presidents' skillfulness and test whether it matters for success in Congress. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. As we move forward, scholarly energies should be devoted to the theoretical development of skill as a concept relevant to the legislative arena, with an eye on measurement and hypothesis testing. Admittedly, this task will be a difficult, but it is a necessary if we are to make progress toward a scientific understanding of presidential success in Congress. Until then, we stick by the conclusion that extraordinary political skills are rarely extraordinary enough to overcome the limits set by context. Varying Effects" and because simple-majority control provides the president's party with control over the congressional committees and agenda. Experiments with the data used here confirm that party size has no effect beyond majority control.
Lebo and O'Geen, "The President's Role in the Partisan Congressional Arena", however, find an independent effect for the size of the president's party beyond majority control. The effects of size of the president's party might be conditional on other factors, such as polarization and party loyalty, which tend to covary. Generally, as party loyalty rises, there will be fewer defections, and thus the president can win with a smaller majority. Moreover, there are other crucial pivot pointsfilibuster and veto pivots-that if party percentages crossed would strongly affect success rates, see Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics. Because instances of such large presidential majorities are rare, we do not include the party-size variable. Talese, 2006) . 24 Alternatively, we could have used DW-Nominate to measure party polarization. The problem with DW-Nominate is that it uses the same value for both years of a congress. Our unit of analysis is year, not Congress. Therefore, the party-voting measure is superior for our purposes since it picks up yearly values. However, party voting and DW-Nominate are highly
